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Taxability of Unincorporated Medical
Associations -The Kintner Regulations
In recent years doctors and other professional groups have- sought
ways to obtain the "fringe benefits" that are normally accorded to "em-
ployees" under the Internal Revenue Code (hereafter referred to as
the Code). Examples of these benefits are social security coverage,1
group hospital and medical coverage, health and accident insurance,2 ex-
clusion of sick pay from gross income,' and most important, tax-exempt
pension and profit-sharing plans.' Most self-employed persons can
obtain these benefits by incorporating their businesses. However, statutes
in most states prohibit professionals from carrying on their practices in
the corporate form.5
Until recently many doctors have successfully gained some of these
advantages, namely tax-exempt pension and profit-sharing plans, by band-
ing together to form medical clinic associations. This has been possible,
since the 1954 Code defines a corporation to include "associations, joint
stock companies, and insurance companies."6 These medical clinics have
been classified as "associations" since they are organized in such a way
as to closely resemble the corporate structure, and thus have achieved
recognition as corporations for federal tax purposes. The member doc-
tors have thus been classified as "employees," as is required to qualify for
a tax-exempt pension plan.' Recently, however, the Commissioner has final-
ized his Regulations, known as the Kintner Regulations, under the i954
Code in this area.' These Regulations, contrary to court authority and
the previous Regulations under the 1939 Code,9 in effect deny profes-
sional partnerships or individuals the opportunity to attain this privileged
tax treatment, even though most non-professional taxpayers can obtain
these benefits through incorporation, a method barred to professional
groups. Much controversy and criticism has developed over the Kintner
1. Doctors of medicine are not covered by the Social Security Act, 64 Star. 492 (1936), 42
U.S.C. § 411(c (5) (1958).
2. Hospital, medical and health and accident premiums are excluded from the employee's
gross income, if paid by the employer. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 106.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104.
4. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
5. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.04. See also, 19 CJ.S. Corporations § 955 (1955); Ray,
Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical Clinics Organized as Associations, 39 TAXES 73, 77
(1961); Note, 11 WEST. REs. L REV. 616, 622 (1960). For comments on professional
incorporation, see Lyon, Acion in Indiana on Kintner Type Organizations, 39 TAXES 266,
271 (1961).
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a) (3) (emphasis added).
7. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), Galt v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 360 (N.D. Texas 1959).
8. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-11 (1960).
9. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-1-9 (1940).
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Regulations. It has been argued that self-employed professionals, un-
like most other groups, have received no preferential tax treatment, and
have thus been classified by the Regulations as "second class" citizens."
This note will attempt to evaluate the effect of the new Kintner Regula-
tions, apprise the tax planner of the difficulties created by the new Regu-
lations, and suggest possible alternative courses of action.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The foundation for the classification of medical clinics as associations
under the Code is the 1935 Supreme Court decision in Morrissey v. Com-
missioner." The Court upheld the Commissioner's contention that an
unincorporated business trust was taxable as a corporation. It stated that
the inclusion of the word "association" within the definition of the word
"corporation" implies resemblance and not identity. Further, although
the presence of corporate forms may be persuasive, the absence of such
forms is not decisive. Thus resemblance and not identity is controlling.
The Court then set forth five characteristic features of a corporation as
distinguished from a partnership. These features are (1) the transfer
of beneficial interests without affecting the continuity of the enterprise,
(2) a limitation of the personal liability of the participants, (3) a free-
dom from termination upon the death or withdrawal of a participant,
(4) the opportunity for a centralized management through representa-
tives of the participants, and (5) an ability to hold title to property used
in the undertaking." The Court declined to prescribe the minimum
standard, but did indicate that the presence of all five characterstics would
show a sufficient resemblance to enable an entity to be taxed as a corpora-
tion. In reaching its decision in the Morrissey case, the court refused to
look at legal technicalities and made a determination of the tax classifi-
cation based on the practical effect of both the state law and the partner-
ship agreement. Thus, under the doctrine expounded in this case an
organization could be taxed as a corporation, even though technically,
under the local state law, it had not incorporated.
In 1936, in the case of Pelton v. Commissioner,3 the Commissioner
successfully applied the doctrine of the Morrissey case to a medical clinic
organized as a trust. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that all
the substantial points of resemblance to a corporation as specified by the
Supreme Court in the Morrissey case were present."4 Thus even though
10. Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 150, 155 (1959).
11. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
12. This last feature is no longer a distinguishing characteristic, since statutes in most states
permit unincorporated entities to hold title to land and other property. UNIFORM PARTNER-
SHIP Acr § 8; OHIo REV. CODE § 1775.07.
13. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
14. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), has been followed by courts holding
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the Supreme Court of Illinois had just decided that a corporation could
not practice medicine in that state, the court of appeals stated that the
trust was an "association" and was therefore taxable as a corporation.
The Regulations under the 1939 Code embodied the doctrine of the
Morrissey case that "local law is of no importance" in determining
whether a business entity is to be regarded as an "association" for tax
purposes.15 Only two of the basic criteria set forth in the Morrissey case
were included in the 1939 Regulations' definition of an association; the
first of these was that the business of the entity must continue uninter-
rupted, notwithstanding the fact that its members may change, and the
second was that the affairs of the business must be conducted by a single
person or group of persons acting in a representative capacity.1"
The present controversy was initiated by the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in the celebrated case of United States v. Kintner." Dr. Kintner
and his associates established the Western Montana Clinic, an unincorpor-
ated association under the law of Montana. The structure of this associa-
tion closely resembled that of a typical corporation. The association
rented space, billed patients, collected fees, and paid salaries to its mem-
ber doctors, paid social security and withholding taxes for its members,
and established a pension plan for its members. The articles stipulated
that death or withdrawal of a member would not dissolve the association,
and that an executive committee would manage the business affairs of
the association. But there were several non-corporate characteristics:
under the articles, any liability of the association incurred without the
authority of this committee was chargeable only to the member who in-
curred the liability, and the interests of the members were nonassignable.
The Commissioner charged Dr. Kintner with additional gross income
of an amount equal to his credit in the pension trust, thereby denying
corporate status to the association for tax purposes. The government
contended that since a corporation is not allowed to practice medicine
under local law, it cannot be classified as an association for tax pur-
poses. 8 The court ruled against the Commissioner and, following the
Morrissey and Pelton cases,' 9 held that an association that more nearly
that business trusts may be treated as associations for federal tax purposes, even though they
are classified as partnerships or trusts under state law. These decisions have rested on the
fact that local law is not controlling for federal tax purposes. Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v.
Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945); Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.
1937).
15. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-1 (1940).
16. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2 (1940).
17. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
18. It is interesting to note that in the Mortissey and Pelton cases it was the government that
was arguing that local law was of no importance, and that resemblance not identity should
be determinative.
19. See notes 11, 13 and 14 supra.
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resembles a corporation than a partnership is a corporation for tax pur-
poses.2" It stated that to determine the nature of associations by local law
would destroy the uniformity essential to the federal tax system. Equal
treatment, said the court, must be accorded to all federal taxpayers, re-
gardless of the laws of the state in which their business activities are car-
ried on. To substantiate this viewpoint the court quoted the following
language from a United States Supreme Court opinion in another tax
case:
The execution of that power [to tax income] is not subject to state con-
trol. It is the will of Congress which controls, and the expression of
its will in legislation, in the absence of language evidencing a different
purpose, is to be interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a
nationwide scheme of taxation.21
Since in the Kintner case the interests of the members were non-assigna-
ble and at least some personal liability on the part of the members was
possible, the court must have decided that the characteristics of continuity
of life and centralized management were sufficient for association status.22
After the Kintner case the Commissioner stated his non-acquiescence
in a revenue ruling in which he declared that he would not recognize
the Kintner case; however, he declined to state what standards he would
use in determining whether or not an entity is an association for tax
purposes.23 In another revenue ruling appearing a year later, in 1957,
the Commissioner reversed himself by stating that he would use the
"usual" tests (seemingly referring to the Morrissey doctrine or the 1939
Regulations) in determining whether an organization was an association
for federal tax purposes2
In the most recent case in this area, Gait v. United States,25 a Texas
District Court held on facts similar to those in the Kintner case that the
medical association of which the plaintiff, Dr. Galt, was a member met
all the requirements needed to incorporate an entity under the laws of
Texas except that local law which prohibited the practice of medicine by
20. United States v. Kintner, note 7 supra. Hewitt in his article, Associations Taxable as
Corporations, 47 A.B.A.J. 215 (1961) (hereafter cited as Hewitt), states that the court
presumably referred to the Regulations under the 1939 Code (note 9 supra), and thus con-
sidered only continuity of life and centralized management.
21. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). The Supreme Court also stated in
reference to this problem that "state law may control only when the federal taxing act, by
express language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon state law."
Id. at 110. See also, Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333, 337 (1929); United States v. Childs,
266 U.S. 304, 309 (1924).
22. See Hewitt, 215.
23. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 598.
24. Rev. Rul. 57-607, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 887. For a brief discussion, see Hobber, Recent
Developments in Tax Free Pension and Profit Sharing Benefits for Self Employed, 33 WIs.
BAR BULL. 35, 36 (June 1960).
25. Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
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a corporation. The court, which for some unaccountable reason failed
to mention the Kintner case in its opinion, found no reason to deny the
association the privilege of being treated as a corporation for tax purposes.
Furthermore, the court stated that the act of a state in classifying business
organizations under the laws of the state should neither raise nor lower
the federal tax due from that organization.26
THE REGULATIONS
In 1959 the proposed Regulations under section 7701 of the Code
were issued.27 These regulations are commonly termed the "Kintner
Regulations," for it was generally believed that the Commissioner would
follow his last revenue ruling" on this subject and base the regulations
on the criteria used by the court in the Kintner case. However this was
not the case, for the proposed regulations seemed to restrict the definition
of the word association, especially in the professional organization area.29
All doubt was dispelled, though, in November of 1960 with the issuance
of the final Kintner regulations under section 7701. This final version,
according to most tax authorities, strengthened the belief that the Com-
missioner intended to exclude all professional associations, especially
medical clinics, from corporate tax status, regardless of their similarity
to the corporate structure."0 Various aspects of the problem of taxing
such associations under the newly adopted Kintner Regulations will next
be considered.
Effect of Local Law
The final Regulations expressly state that the Internal Revenue
Service (hereinafter referred to as the Service) will determine the classes
into which different organizations will be placed for tax purposes.31 Fol-
lowing that statement, however, the Commissioner indicates that local
law will affect such a classification in the following manner:
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local law which
establishes the tests or standards which will be applied in determining
the classification in which an organization belongs, local law governs
in determining whether the legal relationships which have been estab-
lished in the formation of an organization are such that the standards are
met. Thus, it is local law which must be applied in determining such
matters as the legal relationships of the members of the organization
26. Ibid.
27. Treas. Reg. 5 301.7701-1-11 (1960).
28. Rev. Rul. 57-607, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 887.
29. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-11, 24 Fed. Reg. 10451-53 (1959).
30. Ray, note 5 supra, at 75-81.
31. Hewitt states that the Regulations provide that the standards are determined by the
Internal Revenue Code, but the fact is that the standards are stated nowhere in the Code,
only in the Regulations and in the cases. Hewitt, p. 215.
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among themselves and with the public at large, and the interests of the
members of the organization in its assets.3 2
Thus the Service, indirectly, has made local law determinative of the
classification of organizations. This statement is a reversal of the pre-
vious tax policy of the Service and many Supreme Court determinations,
which have always maintained that local law is not controlling.3
Corporate Characteristics
The new Regulations list six characteristics that are normally found
in a corporation. These are (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralization
of management, (5) limited liability, and (6) free transferability of in-
terests.3 4 Since the first two characteristics are essentials of both corpora-
tions and partnerships, the Commissioner states that they should not be
used in distinguishing a corporation from a partnership for tax purposes.35
All of the remaining factors are not needed in order to qualify as an
association; however, the Regulations provide that there must be a suf-
ficient number present so that the organization more nearly resembles
a corporation than a partnership or a trust.3" This seems to be an em-
bodiment of the principles of the Morrissey case. Yet in another para-
graph of this same section the Regulations state that more corporate char-
acteristics than non-corporate characteristics are needed to classify an
entity as an association. 7 Logically, it would seem from this latter lan-
guage that at least three of the last four characteristics (which the Com-
missioner has regarded as valid criteria) are needed to gain association
status."8 The Commissioner takes no position as to the relative import-
ance of these distinguishing features. The scope of this controversy can
be seen only by examining in detail each of the distinguishing character-
istics.
Continuity of Life
According to the Regulations continuity of life exists if death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member
32. Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
33. Treas. Reg. 118, 5 19.3797-1-9 (1940). United States v. Kintner, note 7 supra; Morris-
sey v. Commissioner, note 13 supra; Weiss v. Weiner, note 21 supra.
34. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960). The Regulations (Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2
(a) (1) (1960)) also state in this paragraph that other corporate characteristics may be
considered. Hewitt, at 216, suggests that these other characteristics might include a seal,
certificates of interest, formal directors' meetings, and the holding of title to property.
36. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(a) (1) (1960).
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(3) (1960).
38. For a discussion of this problem see Stutsman, New Kintner Regs, Not Retroactive, Give
Specific Criteria to Test Partnership, 12 J. TAXATION 174, 177 (1960).
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will not cause a dissolution of the organization.' A dissolution is de-
fined by the Regulations to mean any alteration of the identity of an or-
ganization by reason of a change in the relationship between its mem-
bers. Local law is made determinative as to whether a dissolution has
been effected. In this regard the final Regulations have added to the
proposed Regulations the restricting provision that a partnership subject
to the Uniform Partnership Act (hereafter referred to as the UPA) or
to some other similar local statute lacks continuity of life.4" Under the UPA,
which has been adopted in thirty-eight states, or the common law (which
would apply in states without statutes) any change in the relation of the
partners by any partner leaving the business constitutes a dissolution of
the partnership.41 As a practical matter, however, the business is usually
not dissolved, or even interrupted, for the partners usually state in their
agreement that on the death or withdrawal of a partner, the remaining
partners will form a new partnership. Notwithstanding such agree-
ments, however, it seems unlikely that any partnership could meet the
technical requirement of "continuity of life" in the Regulations.
Centralization of Management
Centralized management exists if the organization gives exclusive,
continuing authority to one person or a group of persons, less than the
whole, to make the decisions necessary to conduct the business.43 The
executive must perform more than purely ministerial acts and must
be free to act without first receiving authorization from the entire mem-
bership. The executive need not be a member of the organization. With
respect to management the Regulations state that any partnership subject
to the UPA or a similar statute cannot achieve centralized management
because the mutual agency relationship which exists in a general partner-
ship gives each partner acting within the scope of the business the power
to bind the partnership.4 Although the partners can agree to vest the
exclusive power to bind the partnership in a selected few, this agreement
is ineffective as to outsiders without notice. The Regulations thus say
in effect that a partnership can never have centralized management be-
cause in one instance a central committee could not exert absolute control
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1) (1960).
40. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (3) (1960). Section 29 of the UNIFORM PARTNERsHIP
AcT states that "[tjhe dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the part-
ners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from
the winding up of the business." OHIo REV. CODE § 1775.28. See also UNIFoRm LIMTED
PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 20, 21; Omo REv. CODE § 1781.20 (Supp. 1960).
41. CRANE, PARTNERSHIPs 390-91 (2d ed. 1952).
42. For a detailed analysis of this characteristic see Hewitt, 217.
43. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960).
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960); see CRANE, PARTNERSMIPS 348 (2d ed. 1952).
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over the business affairs of the partnership. This appears to be a strange
and narrow distinction when one considers an analogous situation in cor-
poration law. Although the board of directors of a corporation, analogous
to an executive committee in a partnership, has the power to define and
limit the authority of a corporate officer, such officer acting within the
scope of the business has the power to bind the corporation, even if in
fact the board of directors has not given him the authority to do so."
The Regulations seem to state that a partnership must have a more cen-
tralized managment than a corporation in order to satisfy this characteris-
tic and be classified as a corporation for tax purposes.46
Limited Liability
Limited liability exists if no single member of the organization is
personally liable for the debts of or claims against the organization. 7
The Regulations specifically state that no partnership subject to the UPA
possesses such limited liability, since under the UPA, notwithstand-
ing any agreement between the partners, personal liability exists with
respect to each partner.4" While this dictinction is no doubt valid, it must
be remembered that, practically speaking, most professional partnerships
today have eliminated the drastic possibilities of personal liability through
the use of insurance and agreements to the effect that no partner will be
liable for the wrongful acts of fellow partners unless he is a direct party
to such acts.
Free Transferability of Interests
An organization has free transferability of interests if each of its
members has the power to transfer all the attributes of his interest49 to
others without the consent of other members."0 This characteristic does
not exist, however, if under local law a transfer of a member's interest
45. STEVBNs, CORPORATIONS 771-73 (2d ed. 1949).
46. The Regulations state that a limited partnership can achieve centralized management if
substantially all of the interests are owned by general partners. Treas. Reg. S 301.7701-
2(c) (4) (1960). This statement seems to conflict with the Morrissey case which held that
centralized management is essentially management by representation.
47. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1) (1960).
48. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1) (1960). UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 16. This
section states that there are specific instances in which personal liability does not exist, viz.,
(1) when a general partner of a limited partnership has no substantial assets (however, in
such a case the limited partners are personally liable); (2) when a corporation is a general
partner and has no substantial assets outside of the partnership. Thus it seems that this
characteristic would not be satisfied unless the general partners have no substantial assets out-
side of the partnership. What substantial assets are is not stated.
49. The assignment of the profits of an interest, which is allowed under the UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP Acr 5 27 (1), is not a transfer of all the attributes of an interest, since this
gives to the transferee no right to a voice in the management of the business.
50. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960).
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results in a dissolution of the organization, even though the members
by agreement allow the transfer of interest. Thus in a state that has
passed the UPA, or a similar statute, or has adopted the common law
rule which is similar to that under the UPA, no partnership could satisfy
the characteristic since any transfer of an entire interest under the UPA
results in a technical dissolution."1
The Regulations do allow for a modified form of free transfera-
bility. 2 This modified form exists when a member of an organization
can transfer his interest to a non-member only after he has offered the
interest to the remaining members at fair market value. The Regulations
state, however, that this modified form of the characteristic will be given
less significance in determining the classification of the organization than
the true form.5"
Examples in the Regulations
The Regulations then present seven examples, two of which concern
medical clinics." The first example presents facts seemingly identical to
those in the Galt case except that the management committee in the
example is composed of four members while the committee in the Gait
case had only two members. A further distinction lies in the fact that
the members of the clinic in the Galt case by agreement were personally
liable only when the assets of the clinic and the defaulting members had
been used in fall to reduce the debt, whereas in the example all members
were personally liable for all debts of or claims against the clinic. In
this example the Commissioner holds that, under the "local applicable
law," the clinic satisfies the corporate characteristics of centralized man-
agement, continuity of life, and the modified form of free transferability
of interests. This apparently meets the test that an organization must
have more corporate characteristics than non-corporate characteristics.
Would the same result be reached if only the characteristics of continuity
of life and centralized management were present? The Commissioner
takes no position on this question, but the Kintner case and the 1939
Regulations under this section of the Code indicate that association status
would be given to such an organization. This first example indicates that an
entity similar to the one in the Galt case would be allowed to be taxed
as a corporation. However, it is hard to imagine a state whose "local
applicable law" would permit an organization to achieve the number of
corporate characteristics required of an "association" under the Regula-
tions. It is true that the characteristics might be met by a joint stock
51. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACr 5 29.
52. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
53. Ibid.
54. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1), (2) (1960).
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company or a similar statutory entity, but presumably these latter forms
differ from an association, according to the definition of a corporation
in the Code as interpreted by the Morrissey case."
In the other example concerning a medical clinic the articles of the
entity provided for an organizational structure which would include all
the corporate characteristics in the Regulations. However, when the
local law was applied, the provisions of the agreement were rendered in-
effective. The local law in effect negated the presence of any of the cor-
porate characteristics. Thus the clinic was taxed as a partnership.
VALIDITY OF THE REGULATIONS
The tone of the Kintner Regulations is contrary to previous authority.
The new Regulations are different in two fundamental respects from
the 1939 Regulations and court interpretations of the 1939 Regulations.
First, the 1939 Regulations did not include the characteristics of limited
liability and transferability of interest in the definition of an association.'
Secondly, local law was stated to be of no importance in the 1939 Regula-
tions. Thus the Service was allowed to look at the agreement, instead of
local law, in order to decide whether the characteristics of an "associa-
tion" existed.
The Kintner case was decided on similar reasoning. Had the Kint-
ner case been decided under these new Regulations it undoubtedly would
have gone the other way, for Montana has adopted the UPA. But the
court in the Kintner case as well as the Galt case refused to look at mere
form; instead, substance was examined to determine the actual character-
istics of the clinic. Up to now the courts in the cases in this area have
continually disregarded state law and looked to the articles or the agree-
ment between the parties to determine whether or not the parties have
in effect created an association with characteristics similar to those of
a corporation. For instance, continuity of life existed if, according to
the agreement between the parties, the business was not interrupted by
the death or withdrawal of a partner. Centralized management existed
if, according to the agreement, an executive committee smaller than the
whole acted in its representative capacity to run the business.
There is no doubt that the new Regulations are contrary to previous
authority such as the Morrissey and Kintner cases and the 1939 Regula-
tions, which refused to make local law determinative and used the resem-
blance test rather than strict adherence to technical rules governing cer-
tain corporate characteristics. No doubt the new Regulations will be
clarified and tested through litigation. Will the courts accept the Coin-
55. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, note 13 supra. See also discussion at p. 778, infra.
56. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2 (1940).
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missioner's views or will the Regulations be declared inconsistent with
the intent of Congress? That Congress intended the Commissioner to
make regulations in this area is not in question."7 What is in question
is the meaning Congress intended in their use of the word "associa-
tion." The Code indicates that the Commissioner has wide latitude in
defining the term association and corporation since only the words, and
no restriction or limitation, appear therein. However the decisions of
the Supreme Court must be considered in determining the intent of
Congress. The Supreme Court in the Morrissey case held that since the
phrase joint stock companies is also used in the definition of the word
corporation, association must mean something different from a bona
fide corporation and a joint stock company. As discussed above, it
would appear that the Kintner Regulations have limited the scope of
the word association to such an extent that the only medical clinics that
could qualify under the Kintner Regulations would be clinics organized
as joint stock companies. Considering the above interpretation, it is at
least questionable whether Congress intended to delegate such authority
to the Commissioner.
One question remains. The court in the Morrissey case held that the
definitions, while helpful, are not to be pressed so far as to make mere
formal procedure a controlling test. The Kintner Regulations make
formal procedure a controlling test by making local law determinative of
the characteristics. For this reason, the new Regulations could cause
grossly inequitable treatment of taxpayers. Taxpayers in similar organi-
zations but in different states would be treated differently - some would
be allowed to deduct pension plan payments, some would not. Such a
determination would not provide the uniformity that is essential to a
federal system of taxation. Therefore the formal and technical procedure
for qualifying as an association under the Kintner Regulations could con-
ceivably be declared invalid as being inconsistent with the intent of
Congress.
Moreover the Commissioner seems to have discriminated against
professional men while at the same time creating a loophole for such
organizations as real estate syndicates and theatrical production companies
that desire to act as corporations but who want to be taxed as partner-
ships in order to set off losses against personal income."
It would seem entirely possible that the courts might disregard these
regulations in favor of the "usual" tests of the Morrissey case, for there are
reasonable grounds to hold that the Kintner Regulations are not only
57. Morrissey v. Commissioner, note 13 supra. The Supreme Court also stated in that case
that the Commissioner could clarify and enlarge his Regulations once they were issued.
58. See Hewitt,-221.
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impractical in application, but contrary to the intent of Congress as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court.
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
If the Commissioner can make his Regulations stand, there remain
several possible alternative courses of action, which, if successfully pur-
sued, could permit professional men to attain the highly sought after tax-
exempt pension and profit-sharing plans. One of these proposed alterna-
tives is the Keogh-Simpson Bill (H.R. 10)." This bill was first intro-
duced in 1951. In June of 1961 it passed the House in an amended form.
The passage of this bill would alleviate the necessity of medical clinics
and other professional groups qualifying as associations for federal tax
purposes. The bill provides that a self-employed person who contributes
to his own pension plan through a specially restricted form of life insur-
ance or a trust will not be taxed on such contributions until the benefits
from the plan are made available to him, usually after retirement. Un-
der the bill, self-employed taxpayers who employ three or fewer em-
ployees must limit their annual contributions to $2500 or 10 per cent
(whichever is smaller) of their annual income."0 Self-employed em-
ployers with four or more full-time employees cannot participate in a tax
deductible plan unless the plan covers all employees with at least three
year's service. Also, contributions for employees must be vested. The
current H.R. 10 is a compromise between earlier H.R. 10's and Treasury
Department proposals, which have demanded that employers include
vested contributions for employees in any tax-deductible pension plans.61
The Treasury proposal provides that only those who actually perform per-
sonal services for the business involved can qualify. Further the de-
ductible amounts cannot exceed ten per cent or $2500 of earned income
unless vested contributions to employees' funds exceed that figure or the
total contributions for the self-employed do not exceed one-half of the
total contributions vested in employees or close relatives.
Last year the Senate Finance Committee amended H.R. 10 to such an
extent that it is doubtful that the Senate will accept the House version."
The Senate bill contains restrictions on corporate plans covering stock-
holder-employees who own more than 10 per cent of the stock of the
corporation; the House has refused to accept this provision.
59. Keogh-Simpson Bill, H.R. 10, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
60. Senator Smathers has introduced a bill, S. 59, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1960), that calls
for a $5000 or 20% of earned income limitation on annual deductions. See 39 TAXES 72
(1961).
61. For a more detailed discussion of the Treasury Department proposal, see Stutsman, sapra
note 38. See also, Hobbet, note 24 supra, at 42-44.
62. See 39 TAXBS 72 (1961).
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A second approach that would allow doctors and other professional
groups to qualify for tax pension plans is the repeal of state laws prohibit-
ing professionals from practicing as a corporation and the establishment
of special state incorporation acts* for professional practitioners. Two
states, Connecticut and Oklahoma, already have special legislation which
allows doctors to incorporate." Similar legislation has been introduced
in Indiana.!5 Under the Indiana proposal, the argument that incorpora-
tion of a profession will impair the traditional professional-client relation-
ship is avoided by limiting the powers of the professional corporation so
as to permit only one profession to be practiced in each corporation, to
allow only professionals to hold stock in such corporations, and to pre-
serve the personal liability of the practitioner for his wrongful acts while
engaged in practice. The effect of this legislation would be that physi-
cians could achieve tax status similar to "employees" under federal tax
laws, and still be able to maintain the personal, confidential relationship
with their patients that public policy demands.
Ohio - Limited Partnership Associations
Another possibility, more readily available, is the use of a common
law joint stock company or its statutory counterpart - the limited part-
nership association. A joint stock company has the corporate character-
istics of continuity of life, centralized management, and free transfera-
bility of interests. It does not have limited liability."6 A medical clinic
qualifying as a joint stock company would be taxed as a corporation,
since section 7701 (a) (3) of the Code expressly includes joint stock com-
panies in the definition of a corporation. The member doctors could
then be given tax-exempt pension plans. The use of the joint stock
company would not be at all disadvantageous to doctors desiring to
organize a medical clinic except for the unlimited liability aspect, which
is also present in the partnership form. It is rarely used today, simply
because most business groups find incorporation is easy and practical and
also offers the protection of limited liability.
The limited partnership association, as distinguished from a limited
partnership, is a business entity created by statute in three states (in-
* NOTE: While this issue of the Review was at press, the Ohio Professional Association Act
(Senate Bill No. 550) was signed into law. The Act, which becomes effective October 17,
1961, permits doctors and other professionals to form "professional associations" for the pur-
pose of obtaining retirement and profit-sharing benefits. Text of the act may presently be
found at 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. § 6459.
63. See Lyon, note 5 supra.
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit.. 33, §§ 180-82 (1951); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 510
(1923).
65. See Lyon, note 5 supra.
66. RowLEY, PATXNERsmrs § 59.1 (2d ed. 1960). See also, Note, 11 WEST. REs. L. REv.
616, 629 (1960).
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cluding Ohio) for the purpose of allowing the members to limit their
individual liability."7 The statute requires that the word "limited" ap-
pear in the name of the firm. It further states that not less than three
nor more than twenty-five persons can form such an association and the
association can last no longer than twenty years.68 Of course there is
nothing to stop the members from forming a new association when the
old one has expired.
The limited partnership association has the corporate characteristics
of limited liability, continuity of life,69 centralized management," and
the modified form of transferability of interests.71 The Commissioner in
his 1939 Regulations expressly provided that statutory limited partner-
:ship associations would be taxed as corporations.72 No mention is made
of the limited partnership association in the new Kintner regulations, but
it seems that this type of an association should qualify as a corporation
under the new Regulations and section 7701 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code.
The limited partnership association has rarely been used simply be-
cause there has been no need'to use it. Those that have not found
the partnership form adequate have found it relatively easy to incorporate.
Although doctors will not use this type of association for its limited lia-
bility aspects alone, its use will serve doctors' needs adequately. The
Attorney General of Ohio has recently issued an opinion which states
that doctors may use the limited partnership association to form medical
clinics. 3 Thus the path seems clear in Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsyl-
vania for doctors to obtain their deductible pension plans.
CONCLUSION
The final Kintner Regulations leave no room for doubt that the Com-
missioner will allow no unincorporated medical clinic short of a joint
stock company to be classified as a corporation for federal tax purposes.
Whether these Regulations will be allowed to stand in ensuing court
tests is at least open to doubt in view of their adherence to local law and
67. MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 193, 5§ 20.91-.107; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 341-461; OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 1783.01-.12.
68. OHIO REV. CODE § 1783.01.
69. OHIO REv. CODE § 1783.11.
70. OHIO REv. CODE 5 1783.03 provides that"... [n]o debt shall be contracted, or liability
incurred for the association, except by one or more of such managers [who are elected by the
members] and no liability for an amount exceeding five hundred dollars, except against the
person incurring it, shall bind the association unless reduced to writing and signed by at least
two such managers."
71. OHIo REv. CODE § 1783.05. See also ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIPS § 54.4 (2d ed. 1960).
72. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-6 (1940).
73. Department Reports of the State of Ohio (March 27, 1961, at p. 278).
[September
1961] NOTES 791
their consequent emphasis on form'rather than substance. Even if they
are upheld, doctors may be able to obtain their much desired tax-exempt
pension and profit-sharing plans through the use of joint stock companies
or similar statutory associations, such as the limited partnership associa-
tion in Ohio. State professional incorporation acts and federal legislation
patterned on the Keogh-Simpson Bill provide still other possible means
for the obtaining of pension and profit-sharing plans.
DON P. BROWN
